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Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium
Unemployment in a North–South Model
Hian Teck Hoon*
Abstract
A North–South model is developed which incorporates an endogenous rate of equilibrium unemployment
in the North in the context of long-run growth. It is shown how increases in the size of public debt and
unemployment compensation financed by payroll taxation, all measured relative to productivity, raise the
Northern natural rate of unemployment and, consequently, reduce the global rate of long-run growth.
The effect of the shocks is also to drive down the rate of employment expansion in the South. A set of the 
fundamental determinants of the world terms of trade is obtained, which includes policy parameters.
1. Introduction
Over the past two and a half decades, the growth rates of many of the OECD coun-
tries, particularly in western Europe, have declined compared with the 1950s and 1960s,
while there has been a sharp rise in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This paper
attempts to build a model in which both the equilibrium unemployment rate in the
North and long-run growth are derived endogenously. It demonstrates how economic
shocks drive the equilibrium rate of unemployment, and consequently affect growth
rates in the global economy. In particular, I am interested in studying the effect of an
increase in the size of the public debt as well as an increase in unemployment bene-
fits financed by payroll taxation (all measured relative to productivity) in the North. I
show that the effect of the policy shocks is to raise the amount of joblessness in the
North, which, via an adverse effect on the return to capital, slows the pace of capital
accumulation. Through a learning-by-doing link, this leads to a slowdown in Northern
growth, and ultimately in Southern growth via a terms-of-trade deterioration facing
the South.
The work reported here is related to Findlay (1980) and Taylor (1981) but is clearly
distinct from them in the theoretical specification of the important mechanisms
describing the Northern economy. In Findlay (1980), the Northern economy is a full-
information, neoclassical economy with full employment always prevailing. In the
North developed here, the labor market is characterized by the problem of imperfect
information with labor shirking and costly supervision, and consequently endogenous
job rationing. A form of real-wage rigidity is endogenously derived so that, even in 
a consistent-expectations equilibrium, there exists involuntary unemployment. In 
contrast, Taylor (1981) specifies a Northern economy faced with nominal wage rigid-
ity, with the consequence of short-term Keynesian unemployment or expectational 
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disequilibrium unemployment of the Phillips-curve type. The South is, nevertheless,
specified in the same manner as in the two aforementioned papers; namely, a Lewis-
type labor-surplus economy.
In section 2, I develop the basic model of the world economy exhibiting balanced
growth. Section 3 studies the effect of increased public debt holdings and increased
unemployment compensation, both financed by payroll taxation. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Balanced-Growth Model
In this section, I study the properties of a model with zero debt and unemployment
benefit, characterized by balanced growth in the North. Assuming that a version of the
Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied, I show that the growth rate of the South con-
verges to the Northern balanced growth rate. In the following section, I will then
examine the effect of policy shocks.
Production Conditions in the North
Production and investment are carried out by many identical competitive firms. Addi-
tionally each firm faces a nonclassical labor market where each worker is prone to
shirk. In this setting each of the many identical, atomistic firms seeks a wage policy to
maximize its profits. The single Solow good produced in the North is given by Y N =
F(KN, eLNNN), where YN is defined as output, KN is the capital stock, e is the effort func-
tion to be defined later, LN is a measure of Harrod-neutral technical progress to be
endogenized later, and NN is the number of employed workers in the Northern
economy. It is assumed that the F(·) function is homogeneous of degree one in its two
arguments. By virtue of this, we can write YN = LNLNF(KN/(LNLN), eNN/LN), where LN
is the size of the labor force. Thus the unemployment rate is (LN - NN)/LN and denoted
UN. If, for simplicity, we normalize the labor force to unity, we may write NN ∫ 1 - UN.
The problem solved by the representative Northern firm at each point in time is given
by
where we let kN ∫ KN/LN, rN is the real interest rate in the North, and uN is the 
Northern real wage.
The function F(kN, e[1 - UN]) satisfies the following properties: F1, F2 > 0, F11, F22 <
0, and F11F22 - F 212 = 0. Note that, with the assumption of linear homogeneity of the
production function at the level of the atomistic firm, we can write F(kN, e[1 - UN]) =
kNF1(kN, e[1 - UN]) + e[1 - UN]F2(kN, e[1 - UN]). It follows, by differentiation, that F12(kN,
e[1 - UN]) = -e[1 - UN]F22(kN, e [1 - UN])/kN > 0; that is, capital and labor services are
complements in the Edgeworth–Pareto sense. This feature of the model will provide
us a positive link between the rate of employment and the marginal productivity of
capital.
In the production function, we multiply each unit of labor by an index of the level
of efficiency or effort function, e. The effort function, e, identical across all workers and
faced by any firm, will be written as a function of the real wage received by the worker
hired at the firm, uN; an indicator, zN, of the expected value of net wage earnings for a
worker who loses his job at the firm; the average expected nonwage income of
workers—to be more precise, the average income from wealth, ywN. Here, zN gives the
max , ,LN N N N N N NF k U r k Ue u1 1-[ ]( ) -{ } - -[ ]
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income prospects obtainable in the rest of the economy faced by a worker who loses
his job at the firm where he is currently employed. A plausible specification of the
effort function is that it depends upon the expected nonwage income of the employ-
ees relative to their take-home real wage, ywN/uN, and the prospective real net wage
earnings obtainable elsewhere relative to the take-home pay earned by the worker at
the firm, zN/uN (Hoon and Phelps, 1992; Phelps, 1994). By incorporating a wealth effect
in the shirking propensity, we allow for a sustained productivity growth along with a
nonvanishing equilibrium rate of unemployment. The intuition behind the role played
by wealth in avoiding a vanishing natural rate of unemployment in the process of
growth is the following. As workers become wealthier, the incentive wage that firms
are required to pay to combat shirking rises. As the incentive wage or supply wage
rises along with the demand wage, the latter driven by higher productivity, we are able
to avoid a secular decline in equilibrium unemployment.
We write the effort function as e(zN/uN, ywN/uN) with the properties ∂e/∂ [zN/uhN] ∫ e1
< 0 and ∂e/∂[ywN/uN] ∫ e2 < 0. We further assume that e11 < 0 and e22 < 0 by virtue of the
firm’s second-order condition. In addition, we make the reasonable assumption that
an increase in nonwage income raises a worker’s marginal propensity to shirk with
respect to wage prospects elsewhere; that is, -e12 > 0. Employees are, therefore, more
likely to shirk when job prospects elsewhere improve relative to the net wage they cur-
rently receive; an increase in their expected nonwage income relative to their current
take-home pay also raises the shirking propensity.
Our first-order necessary conditions (which are also sufficient under our assump-
tions) are given by
(1)
(2)
(3)
Equation (1) gives us the firm’s real demand wage by equating the real wage, uN, to
the marginal product of employing an additional worker, eLNF2(kN, e[1 - UN]). Equa-
tion (2) gives the real supply wage the firm has to choose to induce optimal effort from
its workforce. It is obtained after simplifying the following expression:
The addition to the annual cost per worker of motivating its workforce by raising a
penny is one. The benefit per worker of doing so is the contribution to total product
per worker brought about by the higher effort induced. Equating these, and rearrang-
ing, gives (2). Finally, (3) equates the real interest rate to the private marginal product
of capital.
Utility Maximization by Northern Consumer-Workers
I will assume that the worker’s period utility function is Cobb–Douglas in the consump-
tion of the Solow manufactured good, CNm, as well as the Southern agricultural good, CaN;
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that is, the Northern worker’s period utility function is given by CNmbCaN[1-b ], 0 < b < 1.
Defining EN ∫ qCNa + CNm as the total consumption expenditure of the worker, where q is
the relative price of agriculture in terms of manufactures, the assumption of Millian
period utility function implies qCNa = (1 - b )EN and CNm = bEN. I incorporate the 
Blanchard–Yaari overlapping-generations model with a constant labor force (normal-
ized to one). Each agent is assumed to be a supplier to the labor market; and, to avoid
the considerations of risk, I assume that each agent is a unified household with a large
number of members suffering the same unemployment rate as the population as a whole.
As in Blanchard (1985), the critical equation describing the law of motion of per capita
aggregate consumption (measured in terms of the Solow good) is given by
(4)
where EN is per capita aggregate consumption expenditure, r is the rate of time 
preference, m is the constant probability of death, and AN is the nonhuman wealth 
per worker. (I will more clearly define what is included in AN later.) In the next sub-
section I turn to solving the general equilibrium of the Northern economy.
General-Equilibrium Conditions in the North
Equations (1) to (3) summarize the conditions that have to be satisfied for the typical
firm. Using the Salop–Calvo indicator (Salop, 1979; Calvo, 1979):
(5)
where zN is taken to be the wage expected elsewhere adjusted for the probability of
obtaining a job, we note that the effort function, in general equilibrium, is a function
of the rate of employment as well as the nonwage income relative to the real wage;
that is, we can write the effort function as e(1 - UN, ywN/uN). To be more precise, we
need to define the sources of expected nonwage income. In the basic model, without
any policy interventions, nonhuman wealth, AN, is simply given by KN. Hence I will
write ywN ∫ (rN + m)KN, where (rN + m) is the rate of return inclusive of the actuarial
component arising from the use of the Blanchard–Yaari framework. The expected
nonwage income relative to the wage can be expressed as ywN/uN ∫ (rN + m)KN/uN. Using
(1) and (3), we can express the nonwage income to wage ratio as
(6)
Let us be more precise about the behavior of the level of technical progress. Using
a learning-by-doing assumption about technical progress in the spirit of Arrow (1962),
let LN = L(KN); that is, the measure of workers’ productivity depends upon the 
experience derived from capital accumulation. I use here a simple formulation which
assumes that
(7)
where a is a positive constant. It then follows that kN = a, a constant. Using this fact in
(6), we have
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(8)
Note that in (8), under general-equilibrium conditions, the two arguments in the effort
function are 1 - UN and ywN/uN, respectively. Also note that by equating the general-
equilibrium versions of the real demand wage in (1) to the real supply wage in (2), we
obtain the generalized Solow elasticity condition:
(9)
which equates the sum of the partial elasticities to unity. It follows from (9) that around
an equilibrium, 0 < -(1 - UN)e1/e < 1 and 0 < -(ywN/uN)e2/e < 1.
From (3), we also obtain an expression for the real interest rate in general 
equilibrium:
(10)
which shows that the interest rate is equated to the marginal productivity of capital.
Suppose that the economy’s unemployment rate rises from 3% to 10%, roughly 
the order of magnitude that occurred in various OECD countries, especially western
Europe, over the past two and a half decades. The massive increase in idleness result-
ing from the large inflow into the pool of unemployment has a direct depressing effect
on the marginal productivity of capital as labor and capital are Edgeworth–Pareto
complements. This is the direct effect of increased joblessness on capital productivity.
There is, however, an indirect attenuating effect that is at work in this model. As cur-
rently employed workers find the probability of obtaining employment elsewhere is
reduced, they value their jobs more and are induced to work harder. This acts to offset
the direct negative effect. If we proceed with the assumption that the direct effect dom-
inates, a condition given by J ∫ e + (1 - UN){e1 + e2[∂(ywN/uN)/∂(1 - UN)]} > 0, we obtain
the result that a rise in the equilibrium rate of unemployment—that is, a decrease of
1 - UN—leads to a decline in rN as the marginal productivity of capital is reduced as a
result of increased joblessness. The dynamic equation of motion of real consumption
expenditure in the North is
(11)
I now wish to establish that a balanced growth path exists along which output,
capital, and consumption expenditure all grow at the rate of productivity growth, lN ∫
L
.
N/LN. Firstly, note that with kN = a, it follows that K
.
N/KN = lN. It is straightforward to
check from (8) and (9) that given our specification of technology generation in (7), we
obtain constant 1 - UN and ywN/uN. With 1 - UN and ywN/uN constant as KN and LN grow
at lN, it follows that, since YN/LN = F(a, e[1 - UN]), we have that Y
.
N/YN = lN. Assum-
ing that there is no international capital mobility as in Findlay (1980), we have the rela-
tionship YN = EN + K
.
N. Replacing Y N by the production function, it is easy to check
that EN/LN = F(a, e[1 - UN]) - lNa. Then given lN, EN/LN is constant. Hence E
.
N/EN =
lN. From (11), we therefore obtain an expression for the endogenous long-run growth
rate of the Northern economy, lN:
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(12)
The right-hand side of (12) is a decreasing function of lN, so the equilibrium value of
lN is uniquely determined. Noting that sNY N = K
.
N, we have an expression for the
savings rate of the North, sN:
(13)
where lN is implicitly given by (12).
General-Equilibrium Conditions in the South
The South produces a single good, an agricultural good. Let Y S be the output of agri-
culture in the Southern economy. Its constant-returns-to-scale production function is
expressed as Y S = G(K S, N S), where KS is the capital stock used in the South in the
modern agricultural sector and NS is the number of employed Southern workers. It is
convenient to express the output in the South as Y S = N SG(K S/N S, 1) = N Sg(kS), where
kS ∫ K S/N S. As in Findlay (1980), we assume that there is surplus labor in the rest of
the economy à la Arthur Lewis. At an exogenously given real wage expressed in terms
of agriculture, there is an infinitely elastic supply of labor to the modern agricultural
sector. Profit maximization in the modern agricultural sector gives rise to
(14)
where S is the rigid real wage measured in terms of the agricultural good.
With the real wage being rigid, the capital–labor ratio employed in the agricultural
sector is uniquely determined via (14), which I denote S. The profit rate from using
one unit of capital in the agricultural sector is given by
(15)
where q is the terms of trade; that is, the relative price of Southern export (agricul-
ture) in terms of manufactures. This equation links the terms of trade to Southern
growth.With kS uniquely pinned down, at S, it follows that the rate of growth of capital
in the South equals the rate of employment expansion in the Southern modern agri-
cultural sector; that is:
The rate of growth of capital in the South is, in turn, dependent upon the savings of
Southern capitalists, which, following Findlay (1980), is given by sSrSKS, where sS is the
savings propensity of Southern capitalists. Hence K
.
S/KS = sSq g¢( S).
International Trade between North and South
The total import by the North is given by MN = mN(q, EN)LN ∫ mN(q, EN) with nor-
malization. Northern import of the agricultural good is negatively related to the rela-
tive price, q, and positively related to total expenditure. In fact, with Cobb–Douglas
k
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specification of Northern utility, ∂mN/∂EN = 1 - b. The Southern import of the manu-
factured good is
(16)
where mSC is the import demand per Southern worker for the purpose of consumption.
The second term on the right-hand side of (16) is investment demand by Southern 
capitalists.
The international trade balance condition is
(17)
Dividing both sides of (17) by LN, and defining m˜N as the import function of the North
per augmented worker—that is, MN/LN = m˜N(q, eN), where eN ∫ EN/LN—and further
letting g ∫ NS/LN, the trade balance condition can be expressed as
(18)
We can differentiate (18) to obtain
where
Here, c N is the Northern elasticity of import demand and c S is the Southern elastic-
ity of import demand. Under the assumption that 1 - c S - (m˜Nq /mSCg )c N < 0, our cor-
responding Marshall–Lerner condition in the context of this model, it is the case that
q is a positive function of eN but a negative function of g ; that is:
(19)
Noting that eN is a constant along a balanced growth path, I focus on the evolution
of g, and ask whether the South will converge to the balanced growth path of the North.
When the South is also growing at the Northern balanced growth rate, I shall describe
the world economy as being on a global balanced growth path. Since NS grows at the
rate of growth of KS, given constant returns to scale and the rigid Southern real wage,
the evolution of g is
(20)
where we note that q is a negative function of g, as shown in (19). We can readily check
that the dynamic system is stable and that g converges to the unique long-run value
denoted gLR, which satisfies the condition
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(21)
When g < gLR, the Southern economy grows faster than the North. This turns the terms
of trade against the South, which brings the Southern economy’s growth rate to be
equal to the Northern growth rate. Along a global balanced growth path, the employ-
ment in the South must grow at the rate of Northern growth; that is:
(22)
Since, along a global balanced growth path:
(23)
we can use (12) in (23) to obtain an expression for the world terms of trade:
(24)
Equation (24) is an important expression that gives the fundamental determinants
of the terms of trade. Whereas in the Findlay (1980) model where the numerator of
(24) is replaced by the exogenously given rate of growth of the effective labor force,
our model provides a richer set of determinants of the international terms of trade. In
particular, parameters reflecting individual preferences, such as the subjective rate of
time preference, as well as policy parameters, such as social unemployment insurance,
payroll taxation, and debt policy, through affecting the equilibrium rate of unemploy-
ment, influence the terms of trade.
3. Analysis of Economic Shocks
The three developments that are thought to have been an important feature of the
OECD countries in the past two decades are the rise of public debt relative to GDP,
the growth in social insurance schemes, and the rise in payroll taxation (Alogoskoufis
and van der Ploeg, 1993; Layard et al., 1991; Phelps, 1994). We study here the influence
on the world economy of introducing payroll taxes to finance given levels of a 
helicopter drop of public debt as well as introduction of unemployment benefits, all
measured in technical efficiency units. The government budget constraint is
(25)
Note that we shall consider small exogenous increases of dN and bN, financed, via the
government budget constraint, by an endogenous increase in the payroll tax given in
(25).
To study the effect of these policy shocks, we need to redefine the nonwage income
to take-home wage ratio. It is now given by
(26)
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where t N ∫ °N/LN, and uhN, the take-home wage, is related to the real wage faced by
the firm, ufN, by uhN ∫ ufN - °N, °N being the specific payroll tax.
Let us explore the dependence of ywN/uhN on dN, bN, and t N around an initial equi-
librium with zero debt, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes. Straightforward
partial differentiation of (26) gives the following results:
(27)
(28)
(29)
where A ∫ e[1 + (ywN/uhN)(e2/e)]F2 + e[1 - UN][ywN/uhN]e2F22 - a[1 - UN]e2F12 > 0.We make
use here of the fact, shown earlier, that around an equilibrium, 0 < -(ywN/uhN)(e2/e) < 1,
making explicit that the effort function depends on the nonwage income relative to the
take-home wage, ywN/uhN.Also, e2 < 0, F22 < 0, and F12 > 0. Note also that
(30)
where we use a result obtained earlier that, around an equilibrium, 0 < -(1 - UN)(e1/e)
< 1.
To see how the equilibrium rate of unemployment depends on the two policy para-
meters, dN and bN, and the implied increase in t N required to finance the debt and
unemployment benefits given in (25), we use the generalized Solow elasticity condi-
tion in (9), making explicit that the effort function depends on the nonwage income
relative to the take-home wage, ywN/uhN. Differentiating through (9), and using (26) to
(30), we obtain
(31)
(32)
(33)
where
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Hence we arrive at the following important result:
(34)
with fdN < 0 and fbN < 0, where it is understood that the employment rate depends 
negatively on dN and bN both directly via (31) and (32) as well as indirectly via the
required increase in t N via (33) necessitated by the budget constraint in (25). In other
words, we leave out the explicit negative dependence of the employment rate on the
payroll tax since, via the government budget constraint, the tax depends endogenously
on dN and bN.
What is the intuition underlying the result that such a policy experiment contracts
equilibrium employment? One way of thinking about the result is in terms of a 
Marshallian diagram in the (1 - UN, ufN/LN) plane, depicting a demand wage schedule
and an incentive-wage schedule. The former is downward-sloping because a rise in the
employment rate increases the chances of landing a job should one be thrown into the
unemployment pool, consequently weakening job attachment and raising the amount
of shirking. This has the effect of reducing worker productivity; accordingly, the wage
that firms can afford to pay declines with a rise in the rate of employment. The latter
is upward-sloping because, as the labor market tightens, each additional penny paid to
a firm’s workforce has a greater impact on reducing shirking, thus raising the marginal
benefit obtained from paying each worker an additional penny. Hence, the incentive
wage rises as the rate of employment rises. The intersection of these two schedules
gives the equilibrium rate of (un)employment for given policy parameters. If we start
from an initial situation with zero debt, unemployment benefit and payroll tax, the
introduction of a payroll tax, taken alone, has the effect of driving a wedge between
the demand wage and the supply wage. A higher rate of equilibrium unemployment is
required to reconcile the two curves. In the same plane, it is clear that an increase in
public debt and in unemployment benefits raise the amount of fallback income avail-
able to the worker in the event that he loses his job.This tends to weaken his job attach-
ment, which leads to a decline in the demand wage and a rise in the incentive wage at
each rate of employment. The final equilibrium corresponds to increased joblessness.
Recall that 1 - UN is ultimately related to dN and bN via f (dN, bN), fdN < 0, fbN < 0.
The long-run growth rate in the North is now expressible as
(35)
Under the condition that the direct effect of a rise in equilibrium unemployment
dominates the salutary effect that higher unemployment has on work incentives, a con-
dition represented by J ∫ e + (1 - UN){e1 + e2[∂(ywN/uhN)/∂(1 - UN)]} > 0, straightforward
differentiation through (35) around an initial equilibrium of zero public debt, unem-
ployment benefits, and payroll taxation shows that a rise in dN and bN, and the implied
rise in t N, increase joblessness and result in slower growth:
(36)
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(37)
The essential mechanism that is at work in this model is the way that increased 
public debt holding, more generous unemployment benefits, and the implied increased
payroll taxes (all measured relative to productivity levels) cause the fallback income
to rise relative to wage earnings at each level of employment. This leads to poorer 
job attachments and an increased propensity to shirk. As a result, the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment rises as the wage that firms can afford to pay declines while 
the incentive cost-minimizing wage must rise. Equilibrium is restored necessarily at 
a higher rate of unemployment. As more people are thrown out of jobs, capital has
fewer effective units of the cooperating factor to work with, which causes capital 
productivity to decline—though this effect is attenuated somewhat as the workers 
who are fortunate enough to keep their jobs value their work more and slacken less.
(It seems highly unlikely that when over 20 million people in Europe are thrown 
out of their jobs, the disciplining effect of unemployment would be so strong as to 
cause the increased effort of the remaining employed workforce to more than com-
pensate for the loss of manpower due to the loss of jobs.) As the marginal productiv-
ity of capital suffers, the pace of capital accumulation also slows down. Through a
learning-by-doing link, the rate of productivity growth also declines. How does this
affect the South?
The answer is that the slowdown in Northern growth turns the terms of trade against
the South on the new global balanced growth path. This can be seen from the fact that,
along a global balanced growth path, q = lN/(sSg¢( S)), where lN is determined entirely
by Northern parameters. Since q is a function of eN and g, whether gLR rises or falls
depends on what happens to eN, which is ambiguous since eN = F(a, e[1 - UN]) - lNa.
(The policy shocks raise equilibrium unemployment, and under the proviso that the
direct effect of a lower 1 - UN on F(·) dominates, F(·) falls as lN falls.) In the conve-
nient case where eN remains unchanged, lLR is unambiguously raised. In this case, it is
clear that the growth rate of the South steadily falls and converges to the new lower
balanced growth rate of the North. This is because the steady deterioration of the
Southern terms of trade translates into a decline in the profit rate in the South and a
consequent slowdown in the Southern pace of capital accumulation. Since the optimal
capital–labor ratio in the South is pinned down by the rigid real wage, this means that
the pace of employment expansion in the South is also reduced as a result of increased
public sector debt, generous unemployment benefits, and the implied higher payroll
taxes in the North.
4. Conclusion
In recent years, some economists have argued for policies that seek to reverse the dis-
incentives toward work in the OECD. Orszag and Snower (1997) propose the replace-
ment of current unemployment benefit systems by unemployment support accounts.
In the latter scheme, employed people would be required to make ongoing contribu-
tions to their unemployment support accounts, and the balances in these accounts
k
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would be made available to them during periods of unemployment. Because of the
incentive effects in moving from the current unemployment benefit systems to the
unemployment support accounts, this shift in policy has the potential to expand
employment and lower the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
Phelps (1997) has championed the implementation of low-wage employment subsi-
dies to counteract the negative effects of payroll taxes, which I have shown drive up
the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
From the perspective of the present paper, these labor-market policy reforms lead
not only to a decline in the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the North (a level
effect) but also to a rise in the growth rate of the North (a growth effect), which leads
to a higher growth rate in the South via a long-run terms-of-trade improvement.
It is also clear that efforts in the North to reduce the debt to GDP ratio act to 
stimulate growth not only by curtailing consumption but also by lowering equilibrium
unemployment through increasing the returns to work relative to workers’ nonwage
incomes.
Some limitations of the present model can be highlighted in concluding this paper.
The persistently high rate of unemployment, especially in Europe, has occurred along
with slow growth. Although the model captures these features and shows how the
South is affected by sluggish economic performance in the North, in reality, the growth
and employment experiences of countries in the OECD have been varied. For instance,
America experienced fairly low unemployment rates in the 1980s compared with
western Europe. To capture this phenomenon, we would need a three-region world
economy. Also, as noted by Findlay (1980), the North–South model with a labor-
surplus economy gives only a “quasi” steady-state balanced-growth path of this world
economy. Presumably with the engine of growth running, the labor surplus in the 
South would be drained and the South turn into a symmetrical modern economy.
Another item for future research is to incorporate international capital mobility into
the model.
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